Ending Syria’s Cycle of Violence: Reflections on the Coastal Massacres

For several days, towns and villages along the Syrian coast became the stage for mass executions targeting public security forces, army personnel, and civilians, predominantly Alawite but also Sunni, following a wave of bloody attacks carried out in early March by loyalists of the deposed dictator Bashar al-Assad against the Syrian security apparatus. The March 2025 Uprising: A Coordinated Coup Attempt

In the early hours of the attacks on March 6th, launched by a group calling itself the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria”, assailants succeeded in securing key positions across major cities and the administrative centers of Latakia and Tartus in western Syria, as well as the city of Jableh. Regime remnant forces also managed to impose an almost complete siege on police stations and security headquarters.

Numerous reports suggest that the armed uprising bore the hallmarks of a coordinated coup attempt. Ghiath Dalla, former Chief of Staff of the Assad regime’s Fourth Division, reportedly split his forces into three factions: the “Lion’s Shield”, the “Mountain Brigade”, and the “Coastal Shield.” Security forces loyal to the new Syrian administration suffered heavy casualties, with over 250 officers and soldiers killed. This provisional count does not account for those who went missing. Mass graves have since been uncovered, containing the bodies of dozens of Interior Ministry personnel.

To counter this, security and military forces launched a two-stage counter-operation. The first phase focused on restoring control over the densely populated coastal cities, particularly Tartus, Latakia, Jableh, Banyas, and Qardaha.

The Syrian Ministry of Defense then announced the second phase, aimed at restoring control over the mountainous villages still held by remnants of the former regime. Given the challenging terrain, this was expected to be the more arduous and time-consuming of the two phases.

Amid this second phase, figures from the old regime re-emerged in the spotlight. Rami Makhlouf, the regime’s most prominent financial backer and a relative of the Assad family, accused the ousted dictator, Bashar al-Assad, of dragging his Alawite base into a losing battle, dismissing the operation as a foolish move. Accusations also spread against several military figures associated with the former regime, who were accused of fueling the security chaos and leading the assailants. Among the most prominent names were Suhail al-Hassan, known as “The Tiger”, Miqdad Fteha, and Ghiath Dalla.

Born in Jableh in 1970, Suhail graduated from the Air Force Academy in Homs in 1991, and began his career in the Syrian Air Force before joining the notorious Air Force Intelligence Directorate. In 2011, al-Hassan took charge of training the special operations unit and was tasked with leading military campaigns across various Syrian provinces. He played a significant role in suppressing protests, especially in Latakia. He is infamous as the officer who ordered attacks on civilians using barrel bombs (large metal barrels packed with nails, shrapnel, and explosives), dropped from helicopters onto residential neighborhoods, causing thousands of civilian deaths and widespread devastation that can still be seen to this day. 

Another name that surfaced is Miqdad Fteha, a Syrian army officer who, in February of this year, announced the formation of a new military faction called the “Coastal Shield Brigade”, claiming control over 90% of the Syrian coast. Fteha is known for posting videos on social media about the coastal clashes between the Syrian army and regime remnants. In these recordings, he addresses the Alawite community, urging them to keep their weapons and join him in his fight.

Ghiath Dalla, a commander closely linked to Iran and Hezbollah, has resurfaced. Prior to the regime’s downfall, Dalla led a military unit under Maher al-Assad and cooperated with Iranian operatives during battles in Damascus and Zabadani. Local reports indicated that Ghiath Dalla had recently returned to the military scene, leading armed groups under the banner of the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria.”

Meanwhile, Ibrahim Hawija, who headed the Air Intelligence Directorate since 1987, resurfaced after Syrian authorities announced his arrest during a security campaign in Latakia province, which was marked by fierce clashes. Hawija was one of the key figures linked to repressive security operations and was responsible for orchestrating major political assassinations during Hafez al-Assad’s rule, most notably the assasination of Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt on March 16, 1977. Sectarian Violence and Human Rights Abuses

In the aftermath of the clashes between Syrian Security forces and regime remnants, numerous human rights reports documented a sharp rise in extrajudicial killings and violations against civilians, predominantly Alawites. These reports also increasingly criticized the authorities for their failure to protect civilians and their lack of decisive measures to halt the crimes and abuses.

The violence in the coastal region triggered swift international reactions. The United Nations called for an immediate investigation into reports of sectarian killings, expressing concern about civilian casualties. The UN Special Envoy to Syria warned that continued clashes between government forces and remnants of the Assad regime could derail the fragile political transition, calling for restraint and adherence to international law. The European Union condemned the attacks by regime loyalists and welcomed President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s pledge to pursue accountability. Similarly, the Arab League voiced support for Syrian institutions and rejected external interference in the country’s stability.

Regionally, Türkiye warned that the violence in Latakia and Tartus threatened Syria’s unity, while Russia described the escalation as “unacceptable”, reiterating its commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity and the protection of all communities. Hundreds of Alawite civilians reportedly sought refuge at Russia’s Khmeimim military base during the peak of the clashes.

The United States strongly condemned the violence. On March 9, Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized support for Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians, Druze, Alawites, and Kurds, and insisted on accountability for war crimes. The following day, the UN Security Council convened in a closed session at the joint request of Washington and Moscow to address the unfolding security crisis on the Syrian coast, amid growing calls for justice.

Israel, meanwhile, sought to exploit the turmoil, with Israeli Minister of Security Yisrael Katz accusing Syrian government forces of committing atrocities against Alawite civilians. He reaffirmed Israel’s commitment to “protect itself from any threats coming from Syria”, stating that the Israeli army “will remain in the buffer zone and on the Mount Hermon heights, continuing to protect the settlements in the Golan and Galilee.” Katz also vowed to keep southern Syria free of weapons and threats, promising “to protect the Druze population in the area, and whoever harms them will pay the price”, in his own words.

On Thursday, April 3, 2025, Amnesty International issued a report calling on the Syrian government to hold accountable those responsible for the wave of mass killings targeting Alawite civilians in the coastal regions. The report stressed the urgent need to take immediate measures to ensure that no individual or group is targeted based on their sect, affirming that the recent crimes constitute war crimes. The report included eyewitness testimonies from residents of the affected areas, victims’ families, and relatives, and was supported by visual evidence as well as reports from forensic labs such as the Crisis Evidence Lab and human rights organizations. According to information obtained by Amnesty International, militias affiliated with the transitional Syrian government killed more than 100 people in the coastal city of Banyas alone between March 8 and 9. The report documented 32 deliberate and targeted killings against the Alawite minority, with no legal justification. The United Nations documented the killing of 111 civilians in Tartus, Latakia, and Hama governorates, estimating that the total number of victims is much higher. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, many documented cases involved summary executions carried out on sectarian grounds by unidentified armed individuals, members of armed groups affiliated with or supporting Syrian security forces, and elements linked to the former regime.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented unlawful killings of 420 civilians and disarmed fighters, including 39 children, mostly by militias affiliated with the Syrian authorities. Amnesty’s Secretary-General, Agnès Callamard, emphasized that: “it is essential for the new authorities to deliver truth and justice to the victims of these crimes, to demonstrate a clear break from the past and zero tolerance for attacks on minorities...Without justice, Syria risks falling once again into a cycle of atrocities and bloodshed.” Syrian president Ahmad Al-Sharaa stated that his government “will hold accountable anyone involved in the killing of civilians” during the violent clashes. He added in a speech: “We affirm that justice will be pursued firmly, without leniency, against anyone involved in the shedding of civilian blood, those who harmed our people, those who exceeded state authority, or anyone who exploited power for personal gain.” He placed the blame for the violence squarely on the “remnants of Assad”, claiming they “are trying to incite sectarian strife”, and accused them of “attacking hospitals, the army, and other state institutions.” He declared: “We will not tolerate Assad’s remnants; they have only one choice: to surrender immediately to the law”, and pledged to form a fact-finding committee to investigate the events and abuses which took place. 

In response to Amnesty International’s report, the Syrian government issued an official statement expressing its close attention to the findings detailing the bloody events that took place. It also emphasized its commitment to upholding justice and enhancing transparency and affirmed its readiness to cooperate with all international bodies.

The fact-finding committee mentioned by President Al-Sharaa was formed soon thereafter and is composed of five judges, a chief criminal security officer, and a human rights defense lawyer, all experts specialized in documentation and justice. The committee’s spokesperson, Yasser Al-Farhan, stressed that the committee would keep investigation results confidential to protect witnesses’ privacy, with findings to be submitted directly to the relevant courts and judicial authorities. He pointed out that the committee was preparing lists of potential witnesses while ensuring protection for any witness who requests to testify under a witness protection program. He affirmed that “the new Syria is committed to entrenching justice and the rule of law, safeguard the rights and freedoms of its citizens, prevent extrajudicial revenge, and guarantee that no one escapes accountability.”

On March 25, 2025, the fact-finding committee announced it had documented 95 testimonies regarding the events according to legal standards in the city of Latakia, adding that it plans to expand its investigations to other cities.

Al-Farhan said the committee received more than 30 reports about the incidents, inspected 9 sites, and heard testimonies from security, military, and civilian authorities in Latakia. With plans to extend its investigations to Tartus, Banyas, Hama, and Idlib, he has stated: “Conditions are not ideal, and we need everyone’s cooperation to uncover the truth. It is still too early to disclose the investigation results”.At the request of the committee, its Presidential mandate was extended by 3 months, until May 1st, 2025, which was the deadline for receiving accounts from civilians who were subject to violations in Baniyas and its surrounding areas. It is expected that the committee’s report will be released in the coming months. 

Severe contradictions, incomplete information, and rumors spreading like wildfire initially made me hesitate greatly before writing this article, especially given the sensitivity of the topic. Sunni-Alawite sectarian tensions are nothing new, nor is this the first time such security disturbances have occurred since the liberation. However, to better understand the current reality, it is necessary to revisit modern Syrian history and the events that have led us to the present-day. Historical Roots of Alawite-Sunni Tensions

Following the formal French occupation in 1920, France sought to form what was called the “Syrian Levant Army” from the general Syrian population. However, this effort faced widespread rejection from the Sunni majority, which accounted for roughly 80% of the population. This refusal was driven primarily by nationalistic opposition to occupation, as well as a general aversion to military service, especially since many Sunnis bore painful memories of their military conscription during World War I within Ottoman ranks, which had cost them heavy casualties.

The relatively strong economic position of the Sunnis also played a role in their reluctance to join the military; they controlled trade and industry and owned large estates, which reduced their need to enlist. Faced with this widespread Sunni refusal, the French found the Alawite sect to be the most suitable to support their interests and consolidate their influence, for several important reasons. The Alawites were concentrated in one geographic area, the northwest of Syria, unlike the Christians who were scattered throughout the country. 

Another factor encouraging the French was the harsh economic conditions suffered by the Alawites. Many of them joined the French army, seeing it as an opportunity for employment and to gain social and material privileges.

After their occupation, the French divided Syria into four states: one in Damascus, another in Aleppo, a third for the Druze in the south, and the last was the Alawite state along the Syrian coast, including the provinces of Latakia and Tartus. Despite this division, the partitioning failed due to its lack of geographic and economic depth, as well as increasing pressure from Sunni forces, led by the pro-independence National Bloc, which demanded the reunification of Syrian lands.

In fact, the French Levant Army in Syria heavily relied on an uninterrupted supply of Alawite soldiers. After the French withdrawal in 1946, the French Levant Army was merged into the new Syrian national army. This integration transferred a significant number of Alawite officers and soldiers into the Syrian military, creating a strong Alawite bloc within the army that appeared almost like “an army within an army”. The Ba’ath Party

At that time, a large segment of the mid-20th century Syrian army was influenced by the Ba’ath Socialist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, prompting Alawite officers to gravitate towards both as vehicles for career advancement and as protection amid volatile power struggles.

However, as Patrick Seale explains in his book “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East”, the dynamic shifted after the assassination of Colonel Adnan al-Malki in 1955, a Ba’athist officer killed by an Alawite soldier affiliated with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. This event triggered a crackdown on anyone linked to the SSNP, which had the greatest impact in pushing most Alawite officers to join the Ba’ath Party. During this period, leadership of the Alawite officers transitioned from Ghassan Jadid, who was assassinated in 1957, to his brother Salah Jadid, who became the central figure directing and mobilizing officers.

Between 1949 and 1958, Syria endured political instability caused by a series of military coups led by Sunni officers competing against one other. Every officer who came to power purged rival Sunni officers through dismissal, persecution, imprisonment, or exile. During this time of political chaos and constant power struggles among Sunni officers, Alawite officers found opportunities to increase their influence in the military. Since they were a minority, Sunni leaders generally didn’t see them as a direct threat to their control. This made it easier for Alawite officers to gradually build their presence and strengthen their position over time.

In 1958, with the establishment of the United Arab Republic under the union of Egypt and Syria, all political parties were dissolved according to Cairo’s conditions. Yet, the Alawite officers maintained a secret organizational structure that filled the void left by the temporary dissolution of the Ba’ath Party. This structure was led by a military committee chaired by Salah Jadid, which included prominent figures such as Hafez al-Assad, Muhammad Umran, and Abdul Karim al-Jundi (who was in fact an Ismaili).

After Syria’s secession from Egypt in 1961, the military committee exploited widespread popular desire to restore the union, alongside strong support from army officers, to expand its influence and reorganize its ranks. This paved the way for increased impact on the country’s political and military spheres.

The culmination of this came in March 1963, when the Ba’athist military committee capitalized on the strong fervor of Arab unity to persuade Nasserist officers, led by Louay al-Atassi, Muhammad al-Sufi, and Ziad al-Hariri, to cooperate in a military coup aimed at restoring the union between Syria and Egypt. The coup succeeded in bringing these officers to power, but while the Sunni officers focused on symbolic positions, the Alawite officers concentrated on controlling key levers of the army and the state.

Louay al-Atassi was appointed president, Muhammad al-Sufi became defense minister, and Ziad al-Hariri was named chief of staff. Meanwhile, the Alawite military committee worked to consolidate control over strategic positions. Salah Jadid took charge of the Officers’ Affairs Bureau, enabling him to transfer, dismiss, and recruit officers in line with his objectives. Hafez al-Assad assumed command of the Air Force and its bases, while Muhammad Umran led the ground forces, appointed as commander of the Fifth Brigade in Homs and the Seventieth Armored Brigade.

In less than four months, Alawite officers had expanded their control over the army and the state. In July 1963, while President Louay al-Atassi was meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser to discuss restoring the union, the Alawite officers launched a campaign to purge Nasserist officers and union supporters. Amin al-Hafiz, the Interior Minister at the time and a Sunni officer who later became president, took part in this campaign. However, his time in power was short-lived. In 1966, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad led a coup that removed Amin al-Hafiz and brought Nur al-Din al-Atassi as the new face of the Presidency. 

Researcher Raymond Hinnebusch observes in his study “The Alawis of Syria and the Ba’ath Party” that the new Syrian regime opened the door for many Alawites to move down from the mountainous villages on the coast to the plains. This migration was encouraged especially to areas like Wadi al-Ghab, the Akkar plain, and parts of Homs. Hinnebusch notes: “The 1960s agrarian reform involved seizing vast agricultural lands from predominantly Sunni and Christian urban elites and redistributing them to Alawite residents...These strategic measures, further developed by Hafez al-Assad, aimed to undermine the Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities living in these areas that opposed his regime.”

Politically, in this new phase, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad succeeded in sidelining their comrade Muhammad Umran, a member of the Alawite military committee, due to his objections to some of their decisions. This move further consolidated their power. During this period, Hafez al-Assad assumed the position of defense minister, while Salah Jadid made a critical strategic mistake by handing over command of the army to Assad and diverting his attention to managing the state and the party.

Within three years of becoming defense minister, Hafez al-Assad secured full control over the Syrian army. In 1970, he carried out his final coup, overthrowing Salah Jadid and President Nur al-Din al-Atass and imprisoning both. In 1971, Assad declared himself president, inaugurating a new chapter in Syria’s history and commemorating the event as the “corrective movement”.

In his book “The Struggle for Power in Syria”, Dutch historian and diplomat Nicolaas van Dam explains that after seizing power on November 13, 1970, Hafez al-Assad relied heavily on a group of loyal officers who occupied key strategic positions within the armed forces. Van Dam notes that most of these officers were Alawites. Officers from other religious sects, though holding high military ranks, played largely symbolic roles and were not in positions that could threaten Assad’s authority.

Van Dam offers examples to support this point: Major General Naji Jamil, a Sunni officer from Deir ez-Zor, commanded the Syrian Air Force from November 1970 until March 1978. Nevertheless, he was unable to use the Air Force effectively against any military threat to Assad, since the Alawite officers alone controlled the country’s main air bases.

This reality extended to other Sunni officers as well, such as Major General Mustafa Tlass, appointed Minister of Defense in March 1972, and Major General Youssef Shakkour, a Christian from the Greek Orthodox community, who later became Chief of Staff. Although they held prominent official positions, the key command centers and strategic functions of the armed forces remained firmly in the hands of Alawite officers.

If this pattern applied to the officers and military leadership, Raymond Hinnebusch argues in his earlier study that a similar approach was used with the rank-and-file soldiers and non-commissioned officers. While Sunnis played a significant role in the Syrian armed forces since their inception, Sunni recruits from rural areas, such as the villages of Hauran, regions around Homs, and the Euphrates basin, had fewer opportunities for career advancement within elite units like the armored corps, air force, and notorious formations such as the Fourth Division. This division remained under Alawite commanders who traditionally favored recruiting Alawite personnel.

Following the 1973 war, Hafez al-Assad realized he could secure Alawite control over all of Syria, provided he pursued a harsh policy of repression, and an iron fist aimed at crushing the Sunni population. This approach manifested in numerous massacres in places like Jisr al-Shughur and Hama, among others. Despite this overwhelming strategic victory, some members of the Alawite community rejected this path, favoring the idea of establishing an independent Alawite state. Among them was the well-known Alawite minister and writer, Badawi al-Jabal. Revolution, conscription and disillusionment

After Hafez al-Assad’s death in 2000, Alawite dominance over power continued with the succession of his son Bashar al-Assad, effectively inheriting the presidency of the republic. Raymond Hinnebusch points out that after the Syrian revolution began in 2011, many senior Sunni officers, like Abdul Razzaq Tlass and Munaf Tlass, defected. They fled following their failure to suppress the opposition in Rastan, Homs. As a result, Bashar’s regime grew suspicious of Sunni-majority battalions and kept them confined to their barracks. At the same time, facing a shortage of Alawite soldiers, the regime hesitated to confront the uprising directly and struggled to regain control over opposition-held areas.

From 2012, the regime stepped up conscription efforts in the coastal region, calling nearly all males aged 20 to 40 for military service and combat. This was aimed at addressing the sectarian imbalance within the security forces and making up for army losses. According to Hinnebusch, Alawites were more willing to accept this rapid and intensified mobilization compared to Sunnis, Druze, or Christians.

For decades, the Alawites have represented one of the pillars of the Syrian regime, relied upon in the military and security apparatus, which granted them privileges compared to other sects. However, as the revolution dragged on, many Alawites began to feel that they were mere cannon fodder, having sacrificed thousands of dead and wounded to keep Assad in power, only to find themselves living in harsh conditions, with no support or compensation for the severe losses they endured.

Looking back, since assuming power, Hafez al-Assad deliberately dismantled any attempts to establish an independent leadership within the Alawite community, refusing the emergence of any religious or political figures representing Alawites outside the regime’s framework. As a result, the entire sect became inseparable from the state, losing any autonomy in its decisions or alliances.

One of the most prominent manifestations of this isolation is the absence of Alawite political representation outside the regime. Even Alawite figures who defected from the regime were unable to form any alternative political force. Additionally, the regime did not allow any independent religious activity within the sect, depriving it of a unified spiritual authority like other sects. Other communities in Syria, such as the Druze or Christians, were able to establish relations with foreign states and organizations, while Syrian Alawites remained confined solely within the framework of the regime. The Alawite Dilemma Post-liberation

At the local level, the Alawites were historically a closed community with their own traditions, living in relative isolation in the mountains and coastal villages. With the fall of the regime, this insularity turned into a negative isolation that rendered them unable to engage effectively with other components of Syrian society or even with the outside world.

Factors that have exacerbated this social isolation include fear of retribution. After the regime’s collapse, many Alawites felt targeted, which pushed them to isolate themselves further. 

The majority of Alawites worked in the military, security forces, or government jobs linked to the regime. After its fall, they lost their social and economic power. The effects go beyond that: after losing their positions in the state, army, and security, they became a weakened group facing multiple overlapping crises, the most prominent of which is the absence of political leadership.

After the fall of the Assad regime, efforts began to restore order through reconciliation processes that included offers to military personnel from Assad’s forces, both officers and those in hiding, to surrender in exchange for guarantees of no prosecution. However, not everyone trusted these offers, which led many to refuse to lay down their arms and instead fortify themselves in rugged areas or within their towns and villages. This prompted security forces to launch widespread sweep operations across various Syrian provinces.

These security campaigns resulted in numerous arrests, including former officers and security personnel implicated in crimes during the regime’s rule. Armed clashes broke out between security forces and some groups, especially in mountainous and rural areas.

One of the most sensitive aspects of this situation was how the operations management dealt with the Alawite community, particularly since most officers originated from predominantly Alawite regions such as Homs, Tartus, and Latakia. The operations management was keen to avoid any escalation, which was evident in the incident at the Military Academy in Aleppo, where the Alawite community was safely evacuated and their route to Khanasser secured, to prevent their area from turning into a resistant stronghold.

As the Assad regime began to collapse, many officers and military personnel, especially within the security apparatus, had retreated from the military scene and taken refuge in the rugged mountains of Latakia and Tartus, or in some Alawite villages in Homs that still supported them. The difficult geography of the coastal region aided the formation of sleeper cells, and the dense forests and mountains made security sweeps and pursuit operations extremely challenging. Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle The brief historical overview presented in this piece is not meant to justify, excuse, or diminish the tragedy that befell the Alawite community in early March. Nor is it meant to diminish the Syrian government’s responsibility to bring to justice all those responsible for the shedding of blood, whether they were civilians or members of the security forces, and whether the perpetrators belonged to (or were affiliated with) Syrian security forces institutions or remnants of the former regime. Rather, it reflects our responsibility to understand the complex historical context that shapes present realities. This understanding is essential, not as an explanation for the violence, but as a foundation to comprehend how events unfolded and to build a path toward a genuine and comprehensive reconciliation. The cycle of violence in Syria must end, and breaking it requires accountability, transitional justice, and ultimately the full recognition of citizenship rights for all Syrians, regardless of background.

Any talk of alternative solutions, such as partition, which has increasingly been echoed recently, or appealing to foreign powers to impose a reality shaped by external actors, will have catastrophic consequences for all parties involved.

The Syrian coast, stretching from Latakia to Tartus, has long been one of the most sensitive regions in the Syrian landscape due to its strategic importance and the Assad regime’s attempt to portray it as closely linked to the regime for decades. After Assad’s fall, this portrayal and perception will not disappear except gradually, through maintaining a careful balance between justice, accountability, civic nationalism, and security stability.